曼哈顿政策研究所-改革美联储的治理以实现更好的货币效果（英）-2024.3.docx

Ill/March2024ReportReformtheFederalReserve,sGovernancetoDeliverBetterMonetaryOutcomesDanielKatzAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteStephenMiranAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteAboutUsTheManhattanInstituteisathinktankwhosemissionistodevelopanddisseminatenewideasthatfostergreatereconomicchoiceandindividualresponsibility.ExecutiveSummaryCentralbankindependenceiswidelyregardedasanessentialelementofeffectiveeconomicstewardship.Yetpureindependenceisincompatiblewithademocraticsystem.Therefore,anyparticularexampleofcentralbankindependenceWithinademocraticSyStemnecessarilyfeaturesaseriesofjudgmentsaboutthecentralbank'sinstitutionaldesign.Theoverallgoalofthisdesignisdeliveringtheenomicbenefitsofacentralbankthatisinsulatedfromtheday-to-daypoliticalprocesswhilemaintainingalevelofaccountabilitythatademocraticsocietymustdemand.TheFederalReserve,srecordinrecentyearsraisesquestionsaboutwhetherithasbeenoperatinginlinewiththebestpracticesofcentralbankindependence.TheFed,suniquestructure,includingremovalprotections,lengthyterms,andprivateownershipoftheReserveBanksystem,isdesignedtoensuretheindependenceofmonetarypolicy.However,ouranalysisshowsthatinpractice,theFed,scurrentgovernancehasfacilitatedgroupthinkthathasledtosignificantmonetary-policyerrorswhileallowingtheFedtheflexibilitytounwiselyexpanditsremitintoinherentlypoliticalareassuchascreditrationingandbankingregulation.Thisreportarguesthatimportantbenefitsflowfromacentralbankthatcanconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalpressuresandthattoenabletheFedtodoso,itsgovernanceshouldbeoverhauled.WeproposeaseriesofreformsaimedatrecalibratingtheFed,sgovernancetoensurethatitremainsinsulatedfromday-to-daypoliticswhileenhancingitsaccountabilityanddemocraticlegitimacy.TheproposedreformsincluderestructuringthetermsofFedboardmembersandReSerVeBankleaders;alteringthestructureoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)toenhancetherelativepoweroftheReserveBanks;reformingtheReserveBanksystemtoprovidemoreaccountabilityatthestatelevel;andcordoningoffnonmonetarj,-policyfunctionssuchasbankregulationandcrisisresponsefromtheFOMC.ThesechangesaredesignedtocreatebetterincentivestoallowtheFOMCtoconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalconsiderations,partlybyintroducingwhatwecall“monetaryfederalismzztochecktheabilityoftheU.S.presidenttocompletelydominatethebalanceofpowerontheFOMC.ThesechangesalsoensurethattheFedcanoperatewiththenecessaryindependencetoseteffectivemonetarypolicywhilebeingaccountabletodemocraticinstitutions.IntroductionCentralbankindependencehaslongbeenconsideredanessentialelementforsuccessfulmonetarypolicy.Butcentralbanksarecreationsofpoliticalexigency,andpureindependenceexistsonlyintextbks.Thatshibbolethslike“independence“generallydeliversuperiorenomicoutcomesistakenasaxiomaticbytheenomicsandpolicycommunities.Inpractice,centralbankindependenceisintendedtoallowthepursuitoflong-termgoalsdespiteshort-termpoliticalvicissitudes,butitcanalsobestowpowerwithoutaccountability.ButrecentmisstepsattheFederalReservedemonstratethattheFedisfallingshortoftheseaims,withattendantenomicconsequences.1.arge-scaleassetpurchasesfollowingthe2008-09financialcrisisdistortedtheallocationofcreditacrosstheeconomy.Theattempttotightenpolicyin2018hadtobereversedquickly.TheFed,sswiftresponsetoCovid-19isoftenlauded,butitsunilateraltransitiontoaframeworkwhereitexplicitlysoughttoovershtitsinflationtarget/itsexcessivemonetaryaccommodation,anditsdismissalofincipientinflationas“transitory"?contributedtotwoyearsofdecliningrealincomes3andthehighestinflationinfourdecades.4Aclusterofregionalbanksfailedwhiletheirsupervisorswereasleepatthewheel,largelybecausethebankstookinterest-raterisksthatwerereasonablebasedontheirsupervisors'forwardguidanceatoolusedbythecentralbanktoinfluencemarketexpectationsoffutureinterestrates.5Tliischeckeredrecordinvitesthequestion：Whyisasupposedly“independent“centralbankmakingsuchobviouserrors?Thesefailuresareduelargelytotheerosionofthekeyelementsthattraditionallyunderpinnedcentralbankindependence.ScrutinyofFedrhetoricandactionsmakesitclearthattheFedhasmovedbeyonditstraditionalnarrow,technocraticroleandinsteadhaspursuedamuchmoreexpansivemonetaryandregulatoryagendathatismoreconsistentwithanexplicitlypoliticalinstitution.TheFed,smandatehasexpandedtoincludeinherentlypoliticalactivitiessuchascreditallocation,theselectionofeconomicwinnersandlosers,andbanksupervision.Furthermore,theFedhasitselfvoluntarilywadedintohighlypoliticaldebates,suchasurgingincreasedfiscalstimulus6aheadofapresidentialelectionandinrporatingenvironmentalnsiderations7intothefinancialregulatorj,framework.1.eadershipthatWaStraditionallyregardedastechnocratichasbeenreplacedwithhighlyqualified,buthighlypolitical,personnelwhomovefreelybetweentheWhiteHouseandtheEcclesBuilding.Worstofall,policyacuntabilityhasbeenabsent.Currentgovernancestructuresandpracticeslacknegativefeedbackchannels,soprpolicydecisionsdonotnecessaril